Sunday, July 3, 2011

Adopted Family Members Placed Under Genetic Surveillance

OK, the title is misleading, but here's the poop. About two dozen apartment complexes around the country have signed up to have DNA from canine residents entered into a "worldwide database" known as "PooPrints." The apartment manager can send in a swab for DNA profiling and databasing. Then, when renters fail to clean up after their pets, they can send the evidence sample to the Knoxville company, BioPet Vet Lab. [1]

Plainly, this is a niche market. Orchid-Cellmark, a bigger player in the private DNA typing market, won't touch samples of feces.

PooPrints is not the first database to contain profiles from innocent and guilty dogs alike. The picturesque Italian isle of Capri planned a database to help keep it narrow walkways clean. [2] The city of Petah Tikva, near Tel Aviv, took a more positive approach, testing special trash cans in a poop-filled neighborhood and giving the owners a small reward for database hits. [3] Port Phillip, Australia, relied on a voluntary DNA repository in 1998--along with "other evidence such as eyewitness accounts, photographs and video surveillance." [4]

In a more serious vein, a thoughtful review of issues in forensic DNA identification in which dogs are a source of evidence can be found in the latest issue of the Croatian Madical Journal. [5]

References

1. Katie Zezima, Tracing Unscooped Dog Waste Back to the Culprit, with Science, New York Times, July 2, 2011, at A10

2. Capri to Set Up 'CSI-style' DNA Database to Catch Owners Who Refuse to Clean up Dog's Mess, Daily Mail Reporter, Mail Online, April 11, 2011

3. Rebecca Skloot, Dog-poop DNA Bank, N.Y. Times Mag., Dec. 12, 2008

4. Australians Scoop Up Dog DNA, Ariz. Republic, Sept. 26, 1998, at A27.

5. Gunther Scharnhorst & Sree Kanthaswarny, An Assessment of Scientific and Technical Aspects of Canine Forensics DNA, Croatian Medical Journal, 2011, 52: 280-92

Cross-posted from the Double Helix Law Blog.

Saturday, July 2, 2011

New Publication on Expert Evidence Law

The second edition of The New Wigmore Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence by David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein, and Jennifer L. Mnookin, now will be sold in paperback. Previously, Aspen Publishers only advertised this work as part of the $1,195.00 five-volume treatise spanning many topics in the American law of evidence. This new edition (2011) contains additional chapters on forensic science evidence, and the majority of the book deals specifically with scientific evidence. At $240, it is still too expensive, but it is highly recommended.

Disclaimer: This recommendation, coming from the lead author, does not mean much.

Thursday, June 30, 2011

Laboratory Reports and the Confrontation Clause: From Crawford through Bullcoming

This week has seen a lot of activity on the Supreme Court level regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to laboratory reports. The Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him." It applies to both federal and, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state trials.

But what does it mean? When can the prosecution present statements as evidence against a criminal defendant made out of court by someone not produced as a witness in the trial (or some earlier proceeding) at which the defendant can “confront” this witness?

For many years, the Court applied a reliability test to such statements. If the statements seemed reliable for some reason or other—the actual test proved rather weak—the prosecution could use them without presenting the person who said them for cross-examination. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), however, the Court radically revised its view of the Amendment. Writing that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because the defendant is obviously guilty,” a majority reinterpreted the Clause to mean that the prosecution cannot introduce “testimonial” statements accusing the defendant without producing the author of the statements for cross examination. Crawford marked the Court’s acceptance of an interpretation of the Clause championed by Justice Scalia in various concurring opinions.

But Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Crawford offered no single definition of “testimonial.” “Typically,” the Court wrote, testimony is a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Crawford then gave a series, in increasing generality, of “formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.” All applied to the statements at issue in Crawford itself—a wife’s answers to police questions undermining her husband’s claim that he stabbed another man in self-defense.

Not surprisingly, the Court has been fleshing out the meaning of the pivotal term “testimonial” in one succeeding case after another. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the Court held that a woman’s call to a 911 operator about an ongoing “domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend” was not testimonial. In contrast, in the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana, the Court held that another woman’s answers to police questioning—given immediately after the officers came to the couple’s home and observed evidence of recent violence but found “no emergency in progress”—were testimonial.

Two later cases address statements from laboratories undertaking examinations of evidence in criminal investigations. Although it generated a 5-4 split in the Court, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), should have been an easy case. The prosecution introduced into evidence three sworn “certificates of analysis” from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. These affidavits contained “only the bare bones statement that '[t]he substance was found to contain: Cocaine.' At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.” The Court determined that because the “analysts' statements [were] prepared specifically for use at petitioner's trial, [they] were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.” The sworn statements were far more solemn than the wife’s statements to the police in Hammon, and unlike the victim’s statements in Davis about her former boyfriend “here jumpin’ on me again,” their sole purpose was to provide police with facts for a possible prosecution.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09–10876 (U.S. June 23, 2011), involved a laboratory report “certifying that [Donald] Bullcoming’s blood alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggravated DWI.” This time, the state provided more information about the testing, and it did not rely solely on the paper report of the results of the gas chromatography. As the Court described it,
the report presented the “certificate of analyst,” . . . completed and signed by Curtis Caylor, the SLD [New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division] forensic analyst assigned to test Bullcoming’s blood sample. . . . Caylor recorded that the BAC in Bullcoming’s sample was 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters . . . . Caylor also affirmed that“[t]he seal of th[e] sample was received intact and broken in the laboratory,” that “the statements in [the analyst’s block of the report] are correct,” and that he had “followed the procedures set out on the reverse of th[e] report.” . . . Those “procedures” instructed analysts, inter alia, to “retai[n] the sample container and the raw data from the analysis,” and to “not[e] any circumstance or condition which might affect the integrity of the sample or otherwise affect the validity of the analysis.” . . . Finally, in a block headed “certificate of reviewer,” the SLD examiner who reviewed Caylor’s analysis certified that Caylor was qualified to conduct the BAC test, and that the “established procedure” for handling and analyzing Bullcoming’s sample “ha[d] been followed.”
The prosecution introduced this report, over objections, as a business record (a dubious application of this exception to the hearsay rule), but “[o]n the day of trial, the State announced that it would not be calling SLD analyst Curtis Caylor as a witness because he had ‘very recently [been] put on unpaid leave’ for a reason not revealed.” Instead, it put a “surrogate” witness on the stand—“Gerasimos Razatos, an SLD scientist who had neither observed nor reviewed Caylor’s analysis,” but who was happy to testify to “the operation of the . . . machine, the results of [Bullcoming’s] BAC test, and the SLD’s established laboratory procedures.”

The Supreme Court did not buy it. A forensic laboratory’s report prepared for the police in the course of a criminal investigation, it reiterated, was testimonial. The conclusion, the Court insisted, was “inescapable.” As in Melendez-Diaz, the report’s assertions were “‘incontrovertibly . . . affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” in a criminal proceeding.” The state’s claim that “they were simply observations of an ‘independent scientis[t]’ made ‘according to a non-adversarial public duty,’ . . . fares no better here than it did in Melendez-Diaz” because “[a] document created solely for an ‘evidentiary purpose’ . . . made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.” That the reporting analyst did not sign a notarized affidavit was of no moment. The witnesses in Crawford and Hammond did not make sworn statements either. The analyst who was placed on unpaid leave after signing his report knew perfectly well that he was contributing to the state’s case against its suspect. As such, he constituted an accuser within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.

Likewise, the effort to transmogrify a different analyst into the accuser failed. First, “surrogate testimony” about general procedures and instrumentation “could not convey what Caylor knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed. Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part. . . . Nor did the State assert that Razatos had any ‘independent opinion’ concerning Bullcoming’s BAC.” Second, and “[m]ore fundamentally,” the Sixth Amendment “does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”

Although the case might seem to be a relatively straightforward application of Crawford and Melendez Diaz, only five Justices subscribed to Justice Ginsburg’s majority. The remaining four, in a opinion written by Justice Kennedy, deemed the Confrontation Clause satisfied by surrogate testimony:
Whether or not one agrees with the reasoning and the result in Melendez-Diaz, the Court today takes the new and serious misstep of extending that holding to instances like this one. Here a knowledgeable representative of the laboratory was present to testify and to explain the lab’s processes and the details of the report; but because he was not the analyst who filled out part of the form and transcribed onto it the test result from a machine printout, the Court finds a confrontation violation.
Moreover, a final part of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion failed to gain even the narrow majority of the Court that subscribed to the rest of the text of the opinion. This part of the opinion, joined only by Justice Scalia, responded to demands for a forensic-science exception to the requirement of producing “the analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces . . . even if they possess ‘the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa’” by observing that retesting is possible and that “the sky has not fallen” in jurisdictions that routinely produce the necessary analysts as witnesses.

In sum, it appears that many Justices are looking for ways to allow prosecutors to introduce laboratory reports or the information in them into evidence without ever producing the witnesses who did the analyses and wrote the reports. Justice Sotomayor made this plain in a concurring opinion emphasizing the limited scope of the case. She insisted that
First, this is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate purpose, much less an alternate primary purpose, for the BAC report. For example, the State has not claimed that the report was necessary to provide Bullcoming with medical treatment. . . .
Second, this is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue. Razatos conceded on cross-examination that he played no role in producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of Curtis Caylor’s conduct of the testing. . . It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test testified about the results or a report about such results. We need not address what degree of involvement is sufficient because here Razatos had no involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.
Third, this is not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence. See Fed. Rule Evid. 703 (explaining that facts or data of a type upon which experts in the field would reasonably rely in forming an opinion need not be admissible in order for the expert’s opinion based on the facts and data to be admitted). As the Court notes, . . . the State does not assert that Razatos offered an independent, expert opinion about Bullcoming’s blood alcohol concentration. . . . Here the State offered the BAC report, including Caylor’s testimonial statements, into evidence. We would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.
Finally, this is not a case in which the State introduced only machine-generated results, such as a printout from a gas chromatograph. The State here introduced Caylor’s statements, which included his transcription of a blood alcohol concentration, apparently copied from a gas chromatograph printout, along with other statements about the procedures used in handling the blood sample. . . . Thus, we do not decide whether. . . a State could introduce (assuming an adequate chain of custody foundation) raw data generated by a machine in conjunction with the testimony of an expert witness.
Although Bullcoming “does not present . . . any of these factual scenarios,” five days after issuing its ruling, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review a case that falls into her third category, at least in part. I shall describe this newest Confrontation Clause case, Williams v. Illinois when I get another spare moment. Already, there is some confusion about the issue in the case, as can be seen by comparing the description of the issue on the website of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences with the Supreme Court’s specification of the issue.

References

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09–10876 (U.S. June 23, 2011)

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) Blog (contains links to briefs and other materials)

David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence (2d ed. 2011)

Sunday, June 26, 2011

The Consequences of Mistakenly Acquiring a DNA Sample for a Law Enforcement Databank

Should a state be permitted to convict a rapist who is caught because his DNA is placed in a database in violation of the state's DNA databank statute? In People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55 (Cal. 2010), the California Supreme Court upheld the sexual assault convictions of a man whose DNA was taken by correctional officials who mistakenly thought that the state’s DNA database statute applied to the misdemeanor for which he was convicted. This search thus violated the state law but not the U.S. Constitution, which permits DNA sampling from those convicted of some (if not all) misdemeanor offenses. Because the state database law did not prescribe the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy, the California court could have upheld the convictions without discussing the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.

Yet, the Robinson court described a second ground for its action -- the "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The facts of Leon were compelling. Why exclude reliable physical evidence from trial when it was not the constable who blundered, but “a detached and neutral magistrate” who misjudged whether probable cause was present and issued a search warrant? Later cases applied the exception for “good faith” mistakes to other forms of police reliance on facts or other information supplied by officials. Just this month, in United States v. Davis, No. 09–11328 (U.S. June 16, 2011), the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to a search that conformed to circuit court precedent at the time, even though the Supreme Court devised a different rule two years later. More to the point, in Herring v. United States, 555 U. S. 135 (2009), a police officer, pursuing a grudge against a suspect, arrested and searched him and his truck on the basis of a false and negligent report from a clerk in another county of an outstanding arrest warrant. The Court held that this "attenuated negligence" did not warrant the application of the exclusionary rule.

In an essay published last month, I argue that the Robinson court exceeded the boundaries of the good-faith exception by applying it to a nonattenuated negligent mistake. The essay, "Unraveling the Exclusionary Rule: From Leon to Herring to Robinson—And Back?," 58 UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 207 (2011), is at http://uclalawreview.org/?p=1719.

Cross-posted from the Double Helix Law blog.

Saturday, June 11, 2011

The Inspector General's Follow-up Report on the FBI Latent Fingerprint Unit

The Department of Justice's internal watchdog issued a 53-page report on the FBI's progress in meeting recommendations made in the wake of the infamous Mayfield misidentification. Here are the bottom lines (literally):
In conclusion, we believe that the FBI Laboratory has made significant progress in implementing many of the recommendations from our Mayfield Report. Changes to the FBI Laboratory’s procedures and training materials made in the course of this review, such as providing further guidance on the use of Level 3 detail and improving documentation of explanations for differences, represent substantial steps toward reducing the likelihood of errors. We encourage the FBI Laboratory to continue funding and conducting research aimed at validating latent fingerprint analysis and at creating objective criteria for determining sufficiency and declaring an identification. We also strongly support the efforts by the FBI and the CCU to identify the remaining capital cases in which the FBI Laboratory conducted latent fingerprint analysis before December 31, 2006, and to complete the Capital Case Review. We believe that the FBI Laboratory must continue to address these issues to avoid future errors, improve the reliability and accuracy of the latent fingerprint discipline as a whole, and ensure public confidence in the results of its examinations. We believe that full implementation of our recommendations will help the FBI Laboratory in this effort.
The new report is generally thorough, thoughtful, and informative. However, it has a few quirks.

I. Federal Courts?

A very minor but surprising mistake is the statement that "In at least two federal district court cases, however, courts have limited or excluded testimony about latent fingerprint identification based in part on the Mayfield error" (Page 20 n.22). The two cases cited are United States v. Zajac, No. 2:06-cr-00811 (D. Utah Sept. 13 and 16, 2010), and Maryland v. Rose, Case No. K06-0545, Mem. Op. at 5-9, 24-25, 28-31 (Balt. Co. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007). Obviously, a Baltimore County trial judge is not a federal district judge. As I recall, after the state court threw out the fingerprint identification in the state case, the US Attorney's Office made it into a federal case and got the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland to write an opinion on the admissibility of the analyst's testimony. The OIG's footnote ends: "But see United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-26 (D. Md. 2009) (rejecting argument that the Mayfield error called into question the reliability of the ACE-V methodology)."

So as far as I know, there is only one "federal district court case[ to] have limited or excluded testimony about latent fingerprint identification based in part on the Mayfield error." That is Zajac. This case might have led to more such rulings, but I should think that the Noblis-FBI experiment (described in earlier postings) will inhibit any such trend.

II. Linear Thinking?

The new report also states that "[u]nlike some forensic laboratories, the FBI Laboratory uses a “linear” approach to ACE-V, requiring examiners to complete and document their analysis of a latent fingerprint before viewing any known fingerprints or moving to the comparison and evaluation phases" (Page 5). The OIG adds that under new FBI operating procedures:
[E]xaminers must complete and document analysis of the latent fingerprint before looking at any known fingerprint; examiners must separately document any data relied upon during comparison or evaluation that differs from the information observed during analysis; and verifiers or blind verifiers must separately complete and document their ACE examination. The FBI Laboratory refers to this approach as “linear” ACE-V, and Unit Chiefs Soltis and Wieners stated that it eliminates circular reasoning and “cherrypicking” by requiring examiners to identify the characteristics present in a latent fingerprint during analysis before moving to the comparison phase ... .
(Page 27). In its entirety, however, the FBI's examination process is not linear -- at least not unidirectionally linear. It is "oscillatory" -- it goes back and forth. After studying an exemplar, an analyst can return to the latent print and use features not documented the first time through in making the comparison. Indeed, the examiner can go back and forth as many times as desired.

This is not to condemn what some analysts call "recurring examining." If the process is fully documented, the value of using initially undiscovered information could outweigh the risk of bias. The point is that one must view the post hoc comparisons more skeptically.

Neither is the oscillation a form of circular logic. The report defines "circular reasoning" as "the use of data from the known fingerprint to influence the characteristics observed in the latent fingerprint." (Id.) However, it is not necessarily "circular" to use a feature in an exemplar as a clue to what is present in a latent print. Thus, I am not so sure that oscillating between the prints inherently "is a form of confirmation bias or 'mindset' that can lead to unintentional false identifications." (Id.) It would seem more precise to say that the use of the data can result in confirmation bias, which can lead to error.

This does not mean that oscillation is clearly a desirable protocol. Note 28 explains that:
In the Mayfield error, for example, the original examiner encoded seven Level 2 details in the latent fingerprint before being exposed to any candidate fingerprints. After running an IAFIS search and viewing Mayfield’s fingerprint, the examiner changed his interpretation of five of these seven points. Additionally, similarities between the Madrid latent fingerprint and Mayfield’s known fingerprint led the examiner to see other similarities that were not actually present.

The question, as indicated earlier, is whether the benefit of oscillation outweighs the danger.

III. What's independent?

My final nit is the use of "independent" to describe a verification in which the verifier knows the result reached the first time around. To call this "independent," as the FBI does (p. 11), is misleading. If I solve a math after you give me the answer to help me along, my work is not independent. It is more independent that it would have been had you given me a full, written solution that I could have copied, but it is not truly independent.

Reference

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the Office of the Inspector General Report on the Fingerprint Misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield Case (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1105.pdf