"The Judgment of an Experienced Examiner"

The quotation from a textbook on forensic science in the left-hand panel invites the question of what the author was thinking. That an examiner's judgment is more important in comparisons of "class" features than "individual" ones? That the features that are present are less important than the examiner's judgment of them? Neither interpretation makes much sense. The examiner's judgment does not dictate anything about the features. It is the other way around. In applying a valid method, a proficient examiner generally will make correct judgments of significance as dictated by the features that are present.

As with most class evidence, the significance of a fiber comparison is dictated by the circumstances of the case, by the location, number, and nature of the fibers examined, and, most important, by the judgment of an experienced examiner.

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Richard Saferstein, Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic Science 272 (12rth ed. 2018, Pearson Education Inc.) (emphasis added)

Over the years, scientific and legal scholars have called for the implementation of algorithms (e.g., statistical methods) in forensic science to provide an empirical foundation to experts’ subjective conclusions. ... Reactions have ranged from passive skepticism to outright opposition, often in favor of traditional experience and expertise as a sufficient basis for conclusions. In this paper, we explore why practitioners are generally in opposition to algorithmic interventions and how their concerns might be overcome. We accomplish this by considering issues concerning human-algorithm interactions in both real world domains and laboratory studies as well as issues concerning the litigation of algorithms in the American legal system. [W]e propose a strategy for approaching the implementation of algorithms ... .

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Henry Swofford & Christophe Champod, Implementation of Algorithms in Pattern & Impression Evidence: A Responsible and Practical Roadmap, 3 Forensic Sci. Int'l: Synergy 100142 (2021) (abstract)

Another example of sloppy phrasing about expert judgment is the boilerplate disclaimers or admonitions in ASTM standards for forensic-science methods. For example, the 2019 Standard Guide for Forensic Analysis of Fibers by Infrared Spectroscopy (E2224−19) insists (in italics no less) that

This standard cannot replace knowledge, skills, or abilities acquired through education, training, and experience and is to be used in conjunction with professional judgment by individuals with such discipline-specific knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Does the first independent clause mean that fiber analysts are free to depart from the standard on the basis of their general "knowledge, skills, or abilities acquired through education, training, and experience"? Ever since Congress funded the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science (OSAC) to write new and better standards, lawyers in the organization have objected to the ASTM wording (without doubting that expert methods should be applied by responsible experts).

Now rumor has it that ASTM will be changing its stock sentence to the less ambiguous observation that

This standard is intended for use by competent forensic science practitioners with the requisite formal education, discipline-specific training (see Practice E2917), and demonstrated proficiency to perform forensic casework.

That's innocuous. Indeed, you might think it goes without saying.