Showing posts with label PCAST. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PCAST. Show all posts

Friday, July 7, 2023

No "Daubert Hearing" on Latent Fingerprint Matching in US v. Ware

Last month, in United States v. Ware, 69 F.4th 830 (11th Cir. 2023), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit  "carefully review[ed]" the convictions of Dravion Sanchez Ware arising out of a month-long crime spree near Atlanta, in 2017. He was found to have participated "in robbing ... three spas, four massage parlors, a nail salon, and a restaurant." The opinion  recounts the nine brutal robberies in luxuriant detail. It also discusses Mr. Ware's argument that the district court erred "by not holding a formal Daubert hearing before admitting expert fingerprint evidence."

In a word, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument as "unpersuasive." No surprise there. More surprising is the opinion's incoherent discussion of the 2009 NRC report on forensic science and the 2016 PCAST follow-up report. \1/ On the one hand, we are told that "[t]he science could not possibly have been so unreliable as to be inadmissible." On the other hand, "[t]he District Court here could have held a Daubert hearing to assess the relatively new reports Ware presented." So which is it? If a type of evidence cannot possibly be excluded as scientifically invalid under Daubert, how can it be proper to hold a pretrial testimonial hearing on admissibility under Daubert? And, was the court of appeals correct in concluding that the two reports do not impeach, to the point of requiring a hearing, the traditional practice of admitting latent fingerprint comparisons?

During Ware's trial, an unnamed "crime lab scientist with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Division of Forensic Sciences" "outlined the science behind fingerprints themselves, including their uniqueness" and explained the four-step process the lab follows ... : 'Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification,' or ACEV.” The last step "involves another examiner completing the whole process a second time." The opinion does not indicate whether the verifying analyst is blinded to the knowledge of the main examiner's finding. Interestingly as well (think Confrontation Clause), the opinion implies that the testifying expert in Ware was not the main examiner. "[S]he was the verifying examiner," and "she testified that the lab concluded the latent print ... led to an identification conclusion matched to Ware's left middle finger." After that,

Defense counsel specifically asked about the PCAST report [and] vigorously cross-examined ... discussing the possibility of a latent fingerprint not being usable ... , the subjectiveness of every step ... , and the bias that may creep into the verification process ... . The expert and defense counsel discussed ... the potential for false positives and negatives. On cross, the defense also attacked the expert's claim that she did not know of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation ever misidentifying someone with a fingerprint comparison, and that she did not know the rate at which a verifier disagrees with the original assessment.

To preclude such testimony about his unique fingerprint on an item stolen in one of the robberies, Ware had moved before the trial for an order excluding fingerprint-comparison evidence. Of course, such a ruling would have been extraordinary, but the defense contended that the 2009 and the 2016 reports required nothing less \2/ and asked for a full-fledged pretrial hearing on the matter. In response, "[t]he District Court conditionally denied the motion ... unless Ware's counsel could produce before trial a case from this Court or a district court in this Circuit that favors excluding fingerprint expert evidence under Daubert." \3/

The court of appeals correctly observed that "[f]ingerprint comparison has long been accepted as a field worthy of expert opinions in this Circuit, as well as in almost every one of our sister circuits." The only problem is that all the opinions cited to show this solid wall of precedent predate the NRC or the PCAST reports. A more complete analysis has to establish that the scientists' reviews of friction-ridge pattern matching do not raise enough of a doubt to expect that a hearing would let the defense breach the wall. 

Along these lines, the court of appeals wrote that

The [District] Court considered the reports and arguments presented and found that fingerprint evidence was reliable enough as a general matter to be presented to the jury. Many of the critiques of fingerprint evidence found in the PCAST report go to the weight that ought to be given fingerprint analysis, not to the legitimacy of the practice as a whole. Appellant Br. at 25 (“The studies collectively demonstrate that many examiners can, under some circumstances, produce correct answers at some level of accuracy.” (emphasis in original)).

This quotation from the PCAST report is faint praise. Although the court of appeals was sure that "Ware's contrary authority even says that fingerprint evidence can be reliable," the depth of its knowledge about the PCAST (and the earlier NRC committee) reports is open to question. The circuit court had trouble keeping track of the names of the groups. It transformed the National Research Council (the operating arm of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine) into a "United States National Resource Council" (69 F.4th at 840) and then imagined an "NCAST report[]" (id. at 848). \4/ 

Deeper inspection of "Ware's contrary authority" is in order. The 2009 NRC committee report quoted with approval the searing conclusion of Haber & Haber that “[w]e have reviewed available scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method and found none.” It reiterated the Habers' extreme claim that because "the standards upon which the method’s conclusions rest have not been specified quantitatively ... the validity of the ACE-V method cannot be tested." To be sure, the committee agreed that fingerprint examiners had something going for them. It wrote that "more research is needed regarding the discriminating value of the various ridge formations [to] provide examiners with a solid basis for the intuitive knowledge they have gained through experience." But does "intuitive knowledge" qualify as "scientific knowledge" under Daubert? Is a suggestion that friction-ridge comparisons need a more solid basis equal to a statement that the comparisons are "reliable" within the meaning of that opinion? The response to "NCAST" was underwhelming.

But research has progressed since  2009. The second "contrary authority," the PCAST report, reviewed this research. At first glance, this report supports the court's conclusion that no hearing was necessary. It assures courts that "latent fingerprint analysis is a foundationally valid subjective methodology." In doing so, it rejects the NRC committee's notion that the absence of quantitative match rules precludes testing whether examiners can reach valid conclusions. It discusses two so-called black-box studies of the work of examiners operating in the "intuitive" mode. Yet, the Ware court does not cite or quote the boxed and highlighted finding (Number 5).

Perhaps the omission reflects the fact that the PCAST finding is so guarded. PCAST added that "additional black-box studies are needed to clarify the reliability of the method," undercutting the initial assurance, which was "[b]ased largely on two ... studies." Furthermore, according to PCAST, to be "scientifically valid," latent-print identifications must be accompanied by admissions that "false positive rates" could be very high (greater than 1 in 18). \5/

The Ware court transforms all of this into a blanket and bland assertion that the report establishes reliability even though it "may cast doubt on the error rate of fingerprint analysis and comparison." The latter concern, it says, goes not to admissibility, but only to "weight" or "credibility." 

Can it really be this simple? Are not "error rates" an explicit factor affecting admissibility (as well as weight) under Daubert? Certainly, the Eleventh Cicuit's view that the problems with fingerprint comparisons articulated in the two scientific reports are not profound enough to force a wave of pretrial hearings is defensible, but the court's explanation of its position in Ware is sketchy.

At bottom, the problem with the fingerprint evidence introduced against Ware (as best as one can tell from the opinion) is not that it is speculative or valueless. The difficulty is that the judgments are presented as if they were scientific truths. The Ware court is satisfied because "Defense counsel put the Government's expert through his paces during cross-examination, and counsel specifically asked the expert about the findings in the PCAST report." But would it be better to moderate the presentations to avoid overclaiming in the first place? 

The impending amendment to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is supposed to encourage this kind of "gatekeeping." Defense counsel might be more successful in constraining overreaching experts than in excluding them altogether. That too should be part of the "considerable leeway" granted to district courts seeking to reconcile expert testimony.with modern scientific knowledge.

Notes

  1. President's Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016),  [https://perma.cc/R76Y-7VU]
  2. In Ware
    The pretrial motion to exclude the fingerprint identification "relied on the 2009 United States National Resource Counsel (“NRC”) report and subsequent 2016 President's Counsel of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) report, which supposedly revealed a dearth of "proper scientific studies of fingerprint comparison evidence" and claimed that "there is no scientific basis for concluding a fingerprint was left by a specific person," positing that "because fingerprint analysis involves individual human judgement, the resulting [fingerprint comparison] conclusion can be influenced by cognitive bias."
  3. Why insist on a pre-existing determination in one particular geographic region that scientific validity is lacking in order to grant a hearing on whether scientific validity is present? Is the "science" underlying fingerprint comparisons different in Georgia and the other southeastern states comprising the 11th Circuit different from that in the rest of the country?
  4. OK, these peccadillos are not substantive, but one would have thought that three circuit court judges, after "carefully reviewing the record," could have gotten the names and acronyms straight. Senior Judge Gerald Tjoflat wrote the panel opinion. At one point, he was a serious contender for the Supreme Court seat filled by Justice Anthony Kennedy. After Judge Tjoflat announced that he would retire to senior status on the bench in 2019, President Donald Trump nomined Robert J. Luck to the court. In addition to Judge Luck, Judge Kevin C. Newsom, a 2017 appointee of President Trump was on the panel. Judicial politics being what it is, over 30 senators voted against the confirmation of Judges Newsom and Luck.
  5. PCAST suggested that if a court agreed that what it called "foundational validity" were present, then to achieve "validity as applied" some very specific statements about "error rates" would be required:
    Overall, it would be appropriate to inform jurors that (1) only two properly designed studies of the accuracy of latent fingerprint analysis have been conducted and (2) these studies found false positive rates that could be as high as 1 in 306 in one study and 1 in 18 in the other study. This would appropriately inform jurors that errors occur at detectable frequencies, allowing them to weigh the probative value of the evidence.
    The studies actually found conditional false-positive proportions of 6/3628 (0.17%) and 42/995 (4.2%, or 7/960 = 1.4% if one discards "clerical errors.") (P. 98, tbl. 1). Earlier postings discuss these FBI-Noblis and Miami Dade police department numbers.

Tuesday, May 24, 2022

The New York Court of Appeals Returns to Probabilistic Genotyping Software (Part II—General Acceptance)

The New York Court of Appeals returned to the contentious issue of “probabilistic genotyping software” (PGS) in People v. Wakefield, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 02771, 2022 WL 1217463 (N.Y. Apr. 26, 2022). As previously discussed, in People v. Williams, 147 N.E.3d 1131 (N.Y. 2020), a slim majority of the court held that the output of a computer program should not have been admitted without a full evidentiary hearing on its general acceptance within the scientific community. The majority opinion described a confluence of considerations:
  1. The program had only been tested in the laboratory that developed it (“an invitation to bias,” id. at 1141);
  2. The only evidentiary hearing ever conducted on the program had only shown “internal validation” and formal approval by a subcommittee of a state forensic science commission that was a “narrow class of reviewers, some of whom were employed by the very agency that developed the technology,” id. at 1142;
  3. Given “the ‘black box’ nature of that program,” the developer's “secretive approach ... was inconsistent with quality assurance standards” id.; and
  4. Submissions for hearings in other cases “suggested that the accuracy calculations of that program may be flawed,” id.

But which of these four factors were dispositive? Was it the combination of all four, or something in between, that rendered the evidence inadmissible? If the developer were to change its “secretive approach” so as to allow defense experts to study the program’s source code, would that, plus the “internal validation,” be enough to establish general scientific acceptance? Would it be sufficient for the state to refute the suggestions of flawed “accuracy calculations of the program” through testimony from its experts? Just what did the court mean when it summarized its analysis with the statement that “[i]n short, the [PGS] should be supported by those with no professional interest in its acceptance. Frye demands an objective, unbiased review”?

The opinion did not reveal how the majority might answer these questions. Of course, in holding that a hearing was necessary, the Williams majority implied that some information outside of the normal scientific literature could fill the gap created by the absence of replicated developmental validation studies from external (“objective, unbiased”) researchers. But what might that information be?

The court’s encounter with PGS last month did not answer this open question, for the court in Wakefield found that there were replicated studies from the developer of a more sophisticated computer program and other researchers. In addition, it pointed to other evaluations or uses of the program. The totality of the evidence, it reasoned, was stronger than the developer-only record in Williams and demonstrated the requisite general acceptance. But the opinion provoked one member of the court to complain of a "jarring turnabout" from "the same view unsuccessfully advocated by a minority in Williams two years ago."

This posting describes the case, the DNA evidence, and aspects of the discussions of general acceptance that struck me as interesting or puzzling.

The Crime, the Samples, and Some Misunderstood Probabilities of Exclusion

In 2010, John Wakefield strangled the occupant of an apartment with a guitar amplifier cord and made off with various items. The New York State Police laboratory analyzed samples from four areas: the front part of the collar of the victim's shirt, the rear part of the collar; the victim's forearm; and the amplifier cord. The laboratory concluded that the DNA on the collar was “consistent with at least two donors, one of which was the victim, and defendant could not be excluded as the other contributor”; that the DNA from the forearm “was consistent with DNA from the victim, as the major contributor, mixed with at least two additional donors” and the DNA on the cord was “a mixture of at least two donors, from which the victim could not be excluded as a possible contributor.” 2022 WL 1217463, at *1.

At this point, the court’s description of the State Police laboratory’s work becomes had to follow. The court wrote that:

[T]he analyst did not call any alleles based on peaks on the electropherogram below [the pre-established stochastic] threshold. As a result, there was insufficient data to allow the Lab to calculate probabilities for the unknown contributors to the DNA mixtures found on the amplifier cord and the front of the shirt collar.

No alleles at all? It takes only one allele to compute a probability of exclusion, although with such a limited profile, the exclusion probability might be close to zero, meaning that the data are uninformative. In any event, for the other two samples, “[t]he Lab was able to call ... 4 ... STR loci” that enabled “the analyst, using the combined probability of inclusion method, [to opine that] the probability an unrelated individual contributed DNA to the outside rear shirt collar was 1 in 1,088" and “that the probability an unrelated individual contributed DNA ... was 1 in 422" for “the profile obtained from the victim's forearm.”

Or so the court said. As explained in Box 1, these numbers are not “the probability an unrelated individual contributed DNA.” They are estimates of the probability that a randomly selected, unrelated individual could not be excluded as a possible source. Given a large number of unrelated individuals in the region, there easily could be more than a hundred people with STR profiles compatible with the mixtures.

BOX 1: TRANSPOSITION

The probability of inclusion is not the probability that an included individual is the contributor. It is the probability of not excluding an individual as a possible contributor. That probability is not necessarily equal to the probability that an included individual actually contributed to the sample from which he or she could not be excluded. If C stands for contributor and I for included, the probability of inclusion for any randomly selected individual can be written P(I given C). The source probability for the individual is different. It is P(C given I). Equating the two is known as the transposition fallacy (or the “prosecutor’s fallacy,” though it could be called the “judges” fallacy as well).

We do not need any symbols to see that the two conditional probabilities are not necessarily equal. The population of Schnectady county, where the crime occurred, was about 155,000 in 2010. Let’s round down to 150,000. That ought to remove all of Wakefield’s relatives. Excluding all but 1 in 1,088 individuals would leave 138 people as possible perpetrators. Of course, some would be far more plausible suspects than others, but based on the DNA evidence alone, how can the court claim that “the probability an unrelated individual contributed DNA to the outside rear shirt collar was 1 in 1,088”? That probability cannot be determined from the DNA evidence alone. It can be computed only if we are willing to assign a “prior probability” of being the murderer to each of the unrelated individuals in Schnectady (or anywhere else).

Suppose we assume that, ab initio, everyone in the county has an equal probability of being a source of the DNA on the collar. At that point, Wakefield’s probability is quite small. It is 1/150,000. Since the DNA testing would have excluded all but some 138 people, and because Wakefield is one of them, the probability attached to him is larger. Now the probability is 1/138. But that still leaves the vast bulk of the probability with the 137 unrelated individuals. Instead of transposing, we should say that “the probability an unrelated individual contributed DNA to the outside rear shirt collar was 137 out of in 138” rather than the court’s “1 in 1,088.” Of course, our assumption of equal probabilities for every unrelated individual is unrealistic, but that does not impeach the broader point that the mathematics does not make the probability of an unrelated individual the number that the court supplied.

Cybergenetics to the Rescue

To secure a better and more complete analysis, “the electronic data from the DNA testing of the four samples at issue was then sent to Cybergenetics [for] calculating a likelihood ratio—using all of the information generated on the electropherogram, including peaks that fall below a laboratory's stochastic threshold.” Cybergenetics is a private company whose “flagship TrueAllele® technology resolves complex forensic evidence, providing accurate and objective DNA match statistics.” TrueAllele's calculations of the likelihood ratios, using the hypothesis that the four samples contained DNA from an unrelated black individual as the alternative to the hypothesis that Wakefield’s DNA was present were 5.88 billion for the cord, 170 quintillion for the outside rear shirt collar, 303 billion for the outside front shirt collar, and 56.1 million for the forearm.

Wakefield moved to exclude these findings, The Schnectady County Supreme Court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing “over numerous days.” People v. Wakefield, 47 Misc.3d 850, 851, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540 (2015). (New York calls its trial courts supreme courts.) Finding “that Cybergenetics TrueAllele Casework is not novel but instead is ‘generally accepted’ under the Frye standard,” \1/ Justice Michael V. Coccoma (New York calls its trial judges justices) denied the motion. 47 Misc.3d at 859. A jury convicted Wakefield of first degree murder and robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, and seven years after the trial, so did the Court of Appeals (New York calls its most supreme court the Court of Appeals).

Changes in New York’s Highest Court

Back in Williams, the Court of Appeals judges had split 4-3 on whether New York City's home-grown PGS had attained general acceptance. The three judges led by Chief Judge Janet M. DiFiore * objected to the majority’s negative comments about PGS and propounded a narrower rationale for requiring a Frye hearing. But even if one could have confidently applied the majority reasoning in Williams to the scientific status of TrueAllele in Wakefield, the exercise in legal logic might have been futile. In the two short years since Williams, the composition of the court had changed. One concurring judge died, and the majority-opinion bloc lost half its members, including the opinion’s author, to retirements. The reconstituted court gave Chief Judge DiFiore the opportunity to write a more laudatory opinion for a new and larger majority.

Only one judge stood apart from this new majority. Having been in the majority in Williams, Judge Jenny Rivera now found herself in the Chief Judge’s situation in Williams, composing a dissenting opinion with respect to the reasoning on general acceptance but concurring in the result. Drawing on Williams, Judge Rivera maintained that “the court erred in admitting the TrueAllele results but the error ... was harmless” in view of the other evidence of guilt.

The Court’s Understanding of TrueAllele

The opinions are vague about the inner workings of TrueAllele. The majority opinion suggests that what is distinctive about PGS is that it cranks out a likelihood ratio. \2/ But “likelihood ratio,” for present purposes, simply denotes the probability of data given one hypothesis divided by the probability of the same data given a (simple) alternative hypothesis. It has nothing to do with the probabilistic part of TrueAllelle. Indeed, TrueAllele only computes a likelihood ratio after the probability analysis is completed. It does this by dividing (i) the final posterior odds that favor one source hypothesis as compared to another by (ii) the initial prior odds. This division gives a “Bayes' factor” that states how much the data have changed the odds.

Let me try saying this another way. In effect, TrueAllele starts with prior odds based solely on the frequencies of various DNA alleles (and hence genotypes) in some population, performs successive approximations to converge on a better estimate of the odds, and divides the adjusted odds by the prior odds to yield what Cybergenetics calls “the match statistic.” If all goes well, this quotient (call it a likelihood ratio, a Bayes' factor, a match statistic, or whatever you want) reveals how powerful the DNA evidence is (which is not necessarily the same as the odds that any hypothesis is true). At least, that is what I think goes on. The court contents itself with warm and fuzzy statements such as “a probability model to assess the values of a genotype objectively” “based on mathematical computations from all the data in the electropherograms.” and “separates the genotypes using the mathematical probability principle of the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) search to calculate the probability for what the different genotypes could be.” (This last clause may not be so warm and fuzzy; it begins to unpack what I simplistically called successive approximations.)

The Timing for General Acceptance

Wakefield is a backwards-looking case. The main question before the Court of Appeals was whether, in 2015, TrueAllele reasonably could have been deemed to have been generally accepted in the scientific community. That is what New York law requires. \3/ The Chief Judge’s analysis of the general acceptance of TrueAllele starts with the observation that “[t]he well-known Frye test applied to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 [D.C. Cir.1923]) is 'whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally' (People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451 [1994]).”

Wesley is an interesting case to cite here. One would not know from the citation or the analysis in Wakefield that in Wesley there was no opinion for a majority of the seven judges on the court. There was one opinion for three judges and another opinion for two judges concurring only in the result. The remaining two judges did not participate. The concurring opinion was written by the late Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, the longest-serving chief judge in New York history.

Chief Judge Kaye’s concurrence is memorable for its skepticism about finding general acceptance on the basis of studies from the developer of a method. Current Chief Judge Janet DiFiore briefly summarized that discussion (as did the majority in Williams). A more complete exposition is in Box 2. Chief Judge DiFiore then suggests that the Wesley concurrence was satisfied because “[n]otwithstanding these concerns, Chief Judge Kaye ultimately agreed that, at the time the appeal was decided, "RFLP-based forensic analysis [was] generally accepted as reliable" and those testing procedures were accepted as the standard methodology used in the scientific community until the advent of the PCR STR method used today.”

This presentation places an odd spin on the Wesley concurrence. The sole basis for the concurrence was that “it can fairly be said that use of DNA evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” because the DNA evidence “added nothing to the People's case.” 83 N.Y.2d at 444–45. The observations that five years after the hearing in Wesley, it had become clear that “in principle” RFLP-VNTR testing was “fundamentally sound” and was generally accepted were clearly dicta. Chief Judge Kaye was not suggesting that because a method had become generally accepted later, its earlier admission was vindicated. The dicta on later general acceptance was intended to inform trial courts that while they were at liberty to admit RFLP-VNTR evidence without pretrial hearings on general acceptance, they still needed to probe “the adequacy of the methods used to acquire and analyze samples ... case by case.” Id. at 445.

In contrast to Wesley, which emphasized the state of the science “at the time of the Frye hearing in 1988,” 83 N.Y.2d at 425 (plurality opinion), and whether “in 1988, ... there was consensus,” id. at 439 (concurring opinion), Chief Judge DiFiore’s opinion is less precise on when general acceptance came into existence:

BOX 2. PEOPLE v. WESLEY
83 N.Y.2d 417, 439–41, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994) (Chief Judge Kaye, concurring) (citations and footnote omitted)

The inquiry into forensic analysis of DNA in this case also demonstrates the "pitfalls of self-validation by a small group" Before bringing novel evidence to court, proponents of new techniques must subject their methods to the scrutiny of fellow scientists, unimpeded by commercial concerns.

A Frye court should be particularly cautious when — as here — "the supporting research is conducted by someone with a professional or commercial interest in the technique" DNA forensic analysis was developed in commercial laboratories under conditions of secrecy, preventing emergence of independent views. No independent academic or governmental laboratories were publishing studies concerning forensic use of DNA profiling. The Federal Bureau of Investigation did not consider use of the technique until 1989. Because no other facilities were apparently conducting research in the field, the commercial laboratory's unchallenged endorsement of the reliability of its own techniques was accepted by the hearing court as sufficient to represent acceptance of the technique by scientists generally. The sole forensic witness at the hearing in this case was Dr. Michael Baird, Director of Forensics at Lifecodes laboratory, where the samples were to be analyzed. While he assured the court of the reliability of the forensic application of DNA, virtually the sole publications on forensic use of DNA were his own or those of Dr. Jeffreys, the founder of Cellmark, one of Lifecodes' competitors. Nor had the forensic procedure been subjected to thorough peer review. ***

The opinions of two scientists, both with commercial interests in the work under consideration and both the primary developers and proponents of the technique, were insufficient to establish "general acceptance" in the scientific field. The People's effort to gain a consensus by having their own witnesses "peer review" the relevant studies in time to return to court with supporting testimony was hardly an appropriate substitute for the thoughtful exchange of ideas in an unbiased scientific community envisioned by Frye. Our colleagues' characterization of a dearth of publications on this novel technique as the equivalent of unanimous endorsement of its reliability ignores the plain reality that this technique was not yet being discussed and tested in the scientific community.

"Although the continuous probabilistic approach was not used in the majority of forensic crime laboratories at the time of the hearing, the methodology has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community based on the empirical evidence of its validity, as demonstrated by multiple validation studies, including collaborative studies, peer-reviewed publications in scientific journals and its use in other jurisdictions. The empirical studies demonstrated TrueAllele's reliability, by deriving reproducible and accurate results from the interpretation of known DNA samples."

Presumably, and notwithstanding citations to materials appearing after 2015, \4/ she meant to write that the methodology had been generally accepted in 2015 because the indications listed were present then. (Whether the decisive time for general acceptance should be that of the trial rather than the appeal is not completely obvious. If a technique becomes generally accepted later, why should the defendant be entitled to a new trial in which the evidence that should have been excluded has become admissible anyway? The defendant's interest in the time-of-trial rule is the interest in not being convicted with the help of scientifically sound evidence (as per the general-acceptance standard based on the best current knowledge). A counter-argument is that a large pool of potential defense experts to question the application of the general accepted method in the particular case did not exist at the time of trial because the evidence was too novel.)

Quantifying the Accuracy of PGS

Turning to the question of the state of acceptance as of 2015, the majority opinion maintains that

]T]he methodology has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community based on the empirical evidence of its validity, as demonstrated by multiple validation studies, including collaborative studies, peer-reviewed publications in scientific journals and its use in other jurisdictions. The empirical studies demonstrated TrueAllele's reliability, by deriving reproducible and accurate results from the interpretation of known DNA samples.

Both the fact that the software was written to implement uncontroversial mathematical ideas and the published empirical evidence are important. If the software were designed to implement a mathematically invalid procedure, the game would be over before it began. But techniques such as Bayes’ rule and sampling methods for getting a representative picture of the posterior distribution only work when they are developed appropriately for a particular application. Acknowledging that these tools have been used to solve problems in many fields of science is a bit like saying that the mathematics of probability theory is undisputed. The validity of the mathematical ideas are a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for a finding that software intended to apply the ideas functions as intended. Using a particular mathematical formula or method to describe or predict real-world phenomena is an endeavor that is subject to and in need of empirical confirmation. Because PGS models the variability in the empirical data that emerge from chemical reactions and electronic detectors, “empirical evidence ... of its accuracy” is indispensable to establishing its accuracy.

Unfortunately, Wakefield is short on details from the “multiple validation studies” and “peer-reviewed publications.” What do the studies and publications reveal about the accuracy of output such as “5.88 billion times more probable” and “170 quintillion times more probable”? The Supreme Court opinion is devoid of any quantitative statement of how well the deconvoluted individual profiles and their Bayes’ factors reported by TrueAllele correspond to the presence or absence of those profiles in samples constructed with or otherwise known to contain DNA from given individuals. So is the Appellate Division opinion. So too with the Court of Appeals’ opinions. The court is persuaded that “[t]he empirical studies demonstrated TrueAllele's reliability, by deriving reproducible and accurate results from the interpretation of known DNA samples.” But how well did True Allele perform in the “many published and peer reviewed” validity studies?

A separate posting summarizes parts of the six studies circa 2015 that are both published and peer reviewed. The numbers in these studies suggest that within certain ranges (with regard to the quantity of DNA, the number of contributors, and the fractions from the multiple contributors), TrueAllele’s likelihood ratios discriminate quite well between samples paired with true contributors and the same samples paired with noncontributors. For example, in one experiment, LR was never greater than 1 for 600,000 simulations of false contributors to 10 two-person mixtures containing 1 nanogram of DNA—no observed false positives! Conversely, LR was never less than 1 for every true contributor to the same ten mixtures—no observed false negatives in 20 comparisons. Moreover, the program’s output behaves qualitatively as it should, generally producing smaller likelihood ratios for electrophoretic data that are more complex or more bedeviled by stochastic effects on peak heights and locations.

Such results suggest that TrueAllele’s LRs are in the ballpark. Yet, it is hard to gauge the size of the ballpark. Is a computed LR of 5.88 billion truly a probability ratio of 5.88 billion? Could the ratio be a lot less or a lot more? The validity studies do not give quantitative answers to these questions about “accuracy.” \5/

The Developer’s Involvement

On appeal, Wakefield had to convince the court that the unchallenged studies and other indicia of general acceptance were too weak to permit a finding of general acceptance. To do so, he pointed to “the dearth of independent validation as a result of Dr. Perlin's involvement in the large majority of studies produced at the hearing.” (Indeed, Dr. Perlin is the lead author of every one of the five published validity studies and a co-author of a sixth published study that also helps show validity.)

The majority acknowledged “legitimate concern” but decided that it was overcome “by the import of the empirical evidence of reliability demonstrated here and the acceptance of the methodology by the relevant scientific community.” However, the discussion of “the import of the empirical evidence” seems somewhat garbled.

1

First, the court notes that “the FBI Quality Assurance Standards requires ‘a developmental validation for a particular technology’ be published.” That the FBI might be satisfied with a single publication from the developer of a method does not speak to what the broader scientific community regards as essential to the validation. Along with the QAS, the court cites "NIST, DNA Mixture Interpretation: A NIST Scientific Foundation Review, at 64 (June 2021 Draft report)." The page merely reports that the NIST staff were able to examine “[p]ublicly available data on DNA mixture interpretation performance ... from five sources [including] published PGS studies” and that “conducting mixture studies may be viewed as a necessity to meet published guidelines or QAS requirements ... .” That scientists and other NIST personnel who choose to review a technology will read the scientific reports of the developers of the technology does not tell us much about defendant’s claim that Cybergenetics’ involvement in the published validation studies gravely diminishes “the import of the empirical evidence.”

2

Second, the Court of Appeals maintained that “the interest of the developer was addressed at the Frye hearing in this case.” As the court described the hearing, the response to this concern was that “[a]lthough Dr. Perlin was involved in and coauthored most of the validation studies, his interest in TrueAllele was disclosed as required by the journals who published the studies and the empirical evidence of the reliability of TrueAllele was not disputed.”

These responses seem rather flaccid. Some of the articles contain conflict-of-interest statements; most do not. \7/ But the presence or absence of obvious disclaimers does not come to grips with the complaint. Defendant’s argument is not that there are hidden funding sources or financial relationships. It is that interests in the outcomes of the studies somehow may affect the results. The claim is not that validation data were fabricated or that the data analysis was faulty. As with the movement for replication and “open science,” it is a response to more subtle threats.

3

Third, the opinion asserts that “the scientific method” is “entirely consistent with” proof of validity coming from the inventors, discoverers, or commercializers (citing President's Council of Advisors on Sci. and Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, at 46 (2016)). Again, however, the argument is not that only disinterested parties do and should participate in scientific dialog. It is that "[w]hile it is completely appropriate for method developers to evaluate their own methods, establishing scientific validity also requires scientific evaluation by other scientific groups that did not develop the method.” Id. at 80 (https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R76Y-7VU]).

4

That precept leads to the court’s last and most telling response to the “legitimate concern” over “the dearth of independent validation.” The Chief Judge finally wrote that “there were [not only] developer [but also] independent validation studies and laboratory internal validation studies, many published and peer-reviewed.”

But is this a fair characterization of the scientific literature as of 2015? From what I can tell, no more than five or six studies appear in peer-reviewed journals, and none are completely “independent validation studies.” The NIST report cited in Wakefield lists but a single “internal validation” study, from Virginia in 2013, apparently released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, Although the NIST reviewers limited themselves to laboratory studies or data posted to the Internet, they concluded that “[c]urrently, there is not enough publicly available data to enable an external and independent assessment of the degree of reliability of DNA mixture interpretation practices, including the use of probabilistic genotyping software (PGS) systems.” 

Of course, this “Key Takeaway #4.3” is merely part of a draft report and is not a judgment as to what conclusions on validity should be reached on the basis of the published studies and the internal ones. Nevertheless, the court overlooks this prominent “takeaway” (and others). Instead, the Chief Judge asserts that “[t]he technology was approved for use by NIST”—even though NIST is not a regulatory agency that approves technologies—and that “NIST's use of the TrueAllele system for its standard reference materials likewise demonstrates confidence within the relevant community that the system generates accurate results.”

~~~

This is not to say that the scientific literature was patently insufficient to support the court’s assessment of the general scientific acceptance of TrueAllele for interpreting the DNA data in the case. But it does raise the question of whether the court’s assertions about the large number of “independent validity studies” and internal ones that have been “published and peer-reviewed” are exaggerated.

Source Code and General Acceptance

The defense also contended that the state’s testimony and exhibits from “the Frye hearing [were] insufficient because, absent disclosure of the TrueAllele source code for examination by the scientific community, its ‘proprietary black box technology’ cannot be generally accepted as a matter of law.” This argument bears two possible interpretations. On the one hand, it could be a claim that scientists demand open-source programs—those with every line of code deposited somewhere for everyone to see—before they will consider a program suitable for data analysis or other purposes. We can call this position the open-source theory.

On the other hand, the claim might be “that disclosure of the TrueAllele source code [to the defense, perhaps with an order to protect against more widespread dissemination of trade secrets] was required to properly conduct the Frye hearing” and that without at least that much discovery of the code, scientists would not regard TrueAllele as valid. We can call this position the discovery-based theory. It implies that, in establishing general scientific acceptance in a Frye hearing, pretrial discovery of secret code is an adequate substitute for exposing the code to the possible scrutiny of the entire scientific community. \8/

The Wakefield opinions are not entirely clear on about which theory they embrace or reject. Judge Rivera’s concurrence may have endorsed both theories. In addition to accentuating “the need to provide defendant with access to the source code,” she decried the absence of “objective, expert third-party access,” writing that

The court's decision was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law because it relied on validation studies by interested parties and evaluations founded on incomplete information about TrueAllele's computer-based methodology. Without defense counsel and objective, expert third-party access to and evaluation of the underlying algorithms and source code, the court could not conclude that TrueAllele's brand of probabilistic genotyping was generally accepted within the forensic science community.

The “evaluations founded on incomplete information” were from a standards developing organization, a state forensic science commission, and NIST. They were incomplete because, according to Judge Rivera, “without the source code, the agencies could not adequately evaluate the use of TrueAllele for this type of DNA mixture analysis ... .”

Focusing on the discovery-based theory, the rest of the court determined that “[d]isclosure ... was not needed in order to establish at the Frye hearing the acceptance of the methodology by the relevant scientific community. The Chief Judge gave two, somewhat confusingly stated, reasons. The first was that Wakefield sought the source code under a rule for discovery that did not apply and then “made no further attempt to demonstrate a particularized need for the source code by motion to the court.” But it is not clear how the failure “to demonstrate a particularized need” overcomes (or even responds to) the argument that the scientific community will not accept software as validly implementing algorithms unless the source code is either open source or given only to the defendant.

The Chief Judge continued:

Moreover, defendant's arguments as to why the source code had to be disclosed pay no heed to the empirical evidence in the validation studies of the reliability of the instrument or to the general acceptance of the methodology in the scientific community—the issue for the Frye hearing—and are directed more toward the foundational concern of whether the source code performed accurately and as intended (see Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d at 429, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451).

The meaning of the sentence may not be immediately apparent. The defense argument is that giving a defendant (or perhaps the scientific community generally) access to source code is a prerequisite to general acceptance of the proposition that the software correctly implements theoretically sound algorithms. If this broad proposition is false dogma, the court should simply say so. It should announce that source code need not be disclosed because there is an alternative, reasonably effective means for establishing that the software performs as it should. The first part of the first sentence starts out that way, but the sentence then states that “whether the source code performed accurately and as intended” is not a matter of general acceptance at all. It is only “foundational” in the sense identified by Chief Judge Kaye in Wesley, who, as we saw (Box 2), wrote that even though RFLP-VNTR testing was generally accepted, the complete “foundation” for admitting DNA evidence entails proof that the generally accepted procedure was performed properly in the case at bar.

But regarding the argument about source code as falling outside of the Frye inquiry misapprehends the defense argument. Neither the open-source nor the discovery-based theories pertain to the execution of valid software. They question the premise that validity can be generally accepted without disclosure of the program’s source code. Yet, the majority elaborates on its non-Frye "foundational" classification for the source-code argument as follows:

To the extent the testimony at the hearing reflected that the TrueAllele Casework System may generate less reliable results when analyzing more complex mixtures (see also President's Council of Advisors on Sci. and Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, at 80 [2016] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [published after the Frye hearing was held]), defendant did not refine his challenge to address the general acceptance of TrueAllele on such complex mixtures or how that hypothesis would have been applicable to the particular facts of this case. As a result, it is unclear that any such objection would have been relevant to defendant's case, where the samples consisted largely of simple (two-contributor) mixtures with the victim as a known contributor (see also NIST, DNA Mixture Interpretation: A NIST Scientific Foundation Review, at 3 [June 2021 Draft report] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2021/NIST.IR.8351-draft.pdf).

These citations to the PCAST and NIST reports actually undercut any suggestion that source-code secrecy does not implicate Frye. The NIST draft repeatedly states that

Forensic scientists interpret DNA mixtures with the assistance of statistical models and expert judgment. Interpretation becomes more complicated when contributors to the mixture alleles. Complications can also arise when random variations, also known as stochastic effects, make it more difficult to confidently interpret the resulting DNA profile.

Not all DNA mixtures present these types of challenges. We agree with the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) that “DNA analysis of single-source samples or simple mixtures of two individuals, such as from many rape kits, is an objective method that has been established to be foundationally valid” (PCAST 2016).

NIST, DNA Mixture Interpretation: A NIST Scientific Foundation Review, at 2-3 & 11-12 (June 2021 draft) (citations omitted). To demand that “defendant ... refine his challenge to address the general acceptance of TrueAllele on ... complex mixtures or ... the particular facts of this case” is to hold that TrueAllele is generally accepted for use with “single-source samples or simple mixtures of two individuals”—even though the source code is hidden. But if science does not demand the disclosure of source code for general acceptance inside the "single" or simple "zone," then why would it demand disclosure for general acceptance outside that zone?

The court's remarks make more sense as a response to Wakefield’s different discovery argument about the need for source code for trial purposes. This argument does not claim that disclosure of source is essential to general acceptance to exist. It looks to the trial rather than the pretrial Frye hearing. The thought may be that if the accuracy of the program for the “simple” cases is assured, then the need for discovery of the code to prepare for trial testimony is less compelling. The court appears to be responding that because “the samples consisted largely of simple (two-contributor) mixtures with the victim as a known contributor,” there was little need for discovery of the code in this case.

Although this rejoinder departs from the topic of what Wakefield teaches us about general acceptance, I would note that it is difficult to reconcile this characterization of the case with Chief Judge DeFiore’s own description of the samples. The court mentioned four samples. Its initial description of them indicates that the New York laboratory deemed the sample on the amplifying cord to be “at least” a three-person mixture and stated that “because of the complexity of the mixture,” the laboratory could not even compare “results generated from the amplifier cord ... to defendant's DNA profile.” 2022 WL 1217463, at *1. Because of the “stochastic threshold,” the laboratory could discern peaks at only 4 out of 15 loci for “the outside rear shirt collar” and “for the profile obtained from the victim's forearm.” Id. Presumably, the “insufficient data” on “the unknown contributors to the DNA mixtures found on the amplifier cord and the front of the shirt collar” is what led the state to call Cybergenetics for help. These samples are not instances of what PCAST called “DNA analysis of single-source samples or simple mixtures of two individuals, such as from many rape kits” or what the NIST group called “two-person mixtures involving significant quantities of DNA.” They are “more complicated” situations that arise “when contributors to the mixture share common alleles [and] when random variations, also known as stochastic effects” are present.

In sum, the deeper one looks into the Wakefield opinions, the more there is to wonder about. But whatever quirks and quiddities reside in the writing, the nearly unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals signals that a trial court can choose to dispense with the general-acceptance inquiry for at least one PGS program—TrueAllele—for nonchallenging single samples or two-person mixtures and for samples of somewhat greater complexity as well.

NOTES

* UPDATE: On July 12, 2022, Chief Judge DiFiore announced that she will resign on August 31. See, e.g., Jimmy Vielkind & Corinne Ramey, New York’s Top Judge Resigns Amid Misconduct Proceeding: Attorney for Court of Appeals Judge Janet DiFiore Said Her Resignation Wasn’t Related to a Claim that She Improperly Attempted to Influence a Disciplinary Hearing, Wall St. J., July 12, 2022 8:31 am ET, https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorks-top-judge-resigns-amid-misconduct-proceeding-11657629111.
  1. This formulation conflates the issue of novelty with the issue of general acceptance, which can change over time. See Williams, 35 N.Y.3d at 43, 147 N.E.3d at 1143.
  2. The description begins with the remark that “The likelihood ratio in its modern form was developed by Alan Turing during World War II as a code-breaking method.” That is a possibly defective bit of intellectual history, inasmuch as Turing did not develop the likelihood ratio. To decipher messages, Turing relied on a logarithmic scale for the Bayes’ factor in two ways—as indicating the strength of evidence, and as a tool for sequential analysis. Sir Harold Jeffreys had done the former in his 1939 Theory of Probability book. The sequential analysis problem is not clearly connected to PGS. It arises when the sample size is not fixed in advance and the data are evaluated continuously as they are collected. PGS processes all the data at once.
  3. As the court wrote in People v. Williams, 35 N.Y.3d 24, 147 N.E.3d 1131, 1139–40, 124 N.Y.S.3d 593 (N.Y. 2020), “[r]eview of a Frye determination must be based on the state of scientific knowledge and opinion at the time of the ruling (see Cornell, 22 N.Y.3d at 784-785, 986 N.Y.S.2d 389, 9 N.E.3d 884 (‘a Frye ruling on lack of general causation hinges on the scientific literature in the record before the trial court in the particular case’”).
  4. E.g., 2022 WL 1217463 at *7 n.10 (“TrueAllele is not an outlier in the use of the continuous probabilistic genotyping method. Other types of probabilistic genotyping software, such as STRMix, have likewise been found to be generally accepted (see e.g. United States v. Gissantaner, 990 F.3d 457, 467 (6th Cir.2021)).”
  5. Cf. David H. Kaye, Theona M. Vyvial & Dennis L. Young, Validating the Probability of Paternity, 31 Transfusion 823 (1991) (comparing the empirical LR distribution for parentage using presumably true and false mother-child-father trios derived from a set of civil paternity cases to the “paternity index” (PI), a likelihood ratio computed with software applying simple genetic principles to the inheritance of HLA types, and reporting that the theoretical PI diverged from the empirical LR for PI > 80 or so).
  6. At trial, “Gary Skuse, Ph.D., a professor of biological sciences at the Rochester Institute of Technology, testified at trial as a defense witness [and] agreed ... that defendant's DNA was present in the mixtures found on the shirt collar and amplifier cord and that it was ‘most likely’ present on the victim's forearm.”
  7. The articles in the Journal of Forensic Sciences and Science and Justice have no such statements. The “Competing Interests” paragraph in a PloS One article advises that “I have read the journal’s policy and have the following conflicts. Mark Perlin is a shareholder, officer and employee of Cybergenetics in Pittsburgh, PA, a company that develops genetic technology for computer interpretation of DNA evidence. Cybergenetics manufactures the patented TrueAllele Casework system, and provides expert testimony about DNA case results. Kiersten Dormer and Jennifer Hornyak are current or former employees of Cybergenetics. Lisa Schiermeier-Wood and Dr. Susan Greenspoon are current employees of the Virginia Department of Forensic Science, a government laboratory that provides expert DNA testimony in criminal cases and is adopting the TrueAllele Casework system. This does not alter our adherence to all the PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.”
  8. The defense advanced another different discovery theory in arguing that it could not adequately cross-examine and confront Dr. Perlin at trial unless it could access the source code. The court rejected this theory too.

Saturday, November 9, 2019

State v. Simmer: The First High Court Opinion on "Probabilistic Genotyping"

Last week, the Nebrasks Supreme Court affirmed the admission of testimony about what has been dubbed "probabilistic genotyping." Twelve years ago, in 2007, Joy Blanchard was discovered on the floor of her home. Two knives protruded from her neck. A spindle broken from the banister lay nearby. The cause of death was blunt force trauma and stab wounds to the head and neck. Investigators swabbed the spindle, the handles on both knives, and the interior front door knob. Nine years passed before DNA testing indicated the presence of DNA from Joy's nephew, Charles Simmer, on one of the knife handles and the door knob.

Charged with first-degree murder Simmer filed a pretrial motion to preclude “any and all testimony concerning DNA testing and the results of said testing,” including “identification” and “comparison.” After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. At the jury trial, the state presented both "probabilistic genotyping" from Dr. Mark Perlin, the inventor of a complex software program named TrueAllele, that "the match between the knife handle and Simmer was 3.71 thousand times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated person, while the match between the doorknob and Simmer was 4.22 quintillion times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated person." Simmer was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

What made the "genotyping" "probabilistic" is not that genes were typed. The STRs used in the identification are not genes. They are repeated, noncoding sequences of DNA base pairs (such as TAGATAGATAGATAGATAGATAGATAGA) that are sprinkled within and between genes. Neither Is the typing "probabilistic" because probabilities were quoted. Ordinary DNA typing results are accompanied by "random match probabilities."

Rather, unlike ordinary DNA profiling of a single-source samples, these probabilities were not derived from any one individual's features as inferred by a human examiner. The samples were mixtures of DNA from (at least) two men, and no one could say which two individual profiles were in the mixture. The computer program, however, could estimate the probability of the mixed-up collection of DNA features displaying the measured "peak heights" when coming from DNA from several individuals including the defendant as opposed to the probability of the same data coming from DNA from individuals not including the defendant.

Dr. Perlin testified to the ratio of those probabilities (more technically, of those probability densities) using the confusing phrase "match probability" when in fact there was no simple match. He framed the question as "How much more does the suspect match the evidence at this location than a random person?" But any random profile either would match -- in the sense of having the same alleles as those giving rise tom the observed peaks -- or it would not. Because of the ambiguity as to the true profiles in the mixture, the common-sense notion of a match -- of inclusions to and exclusions from -- the class of possible contributors to the mixture is not part of the logic of "probabilistic geneotyping."

Be that as it may, the issue on appeal in State v. Simmer, 304 Neb. 369 (2019), was not how to present the output of the software. It was whether that output could be the subject of any testimony at all. The Nebraska Supreme Court ran through the usual "Daubert factors." Despite arguments about the type of validation studies, the court was impressed with the sheer number of studies and the length of time that the system has been used.

The defendant's expert was Nathaniel Adams, who "has a bachelor’s degree in computer science and is employed by a company that 'consult[s] with lawyers.'" Mr. Adams testified (correctly) that one cannot directly validate the accuracy of particular likelihood ratios and that the software had not been developed and tested from the standpoint of software engineering, which, he suggested, requires independent study of source code over long periods of time. The Supreme Court was not impressed. It held that validation "from a software engineering perspective" was not essential and that the publication of research on the performance of the software (as best as that could be measured for known mixtures and via simulations) was sufficient.

The defense also maintained that "the validation studies must be discounted because Perlin is a coauthor of some of the publications and, as the owner of the company that owns. TrueAllele, has a financial interest in seeing it found reliable" To this, the Supreme Court responded that there were plenty of studies in which Perlin was not an author, but it also suggested that the source of validation studies is irrelevant because that fact pertains only to credibility:
In other words, Simmer is contending that there are reasons to question Perlin’s credibility. Even assuming that is true, an attack on the credibility of an expert witness is not aimed at the expert’s reasoning or methodology and is thus not the proper basis for a Daubert/Schafersman challenge. See Smith v. Colorado Organ Recovery Sys., 269 Neb. 578, 694 N.W.2d 610 (2005) (stating that challenge to expert witnesses' credibility is not Daubert/Schafersman claim).
This cannot be correct. Although the credibility of a particular witness certainly is fair game at trial, Independent replication of experiments is an important factor in scientific practice. The absence of validation from independent researchers should count against admissibility, although it would not necessarily be dispositive under Daubert.

Another questionable feature of the opinion lies in its discussion of the PCAST Report. In 2016 and 2017, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology evinced dissatisfaction with the extent to which probabilisitc genotyping as applied in some situations had been validated. The software developers disputed the report -- but later responded with additional studies. The peculiarity in Simmer is not that the court determined that the output of TrueAllele was admissible despite PCAST's reservations. It is that the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to read the PCAST Report because it "is not in [the] record [on appeal]." Instead, it looked only at an obscure and incomplete "Washington trial court order containing a description of the report." On that basis, it wrote that "with no scientific evidence in the record indicating that TrueAllele could not generate reliable results under the circumstances here, we cannot say that a conclusion that TrueAllele could reliably be applied to the facts of this case would amount to an abuse of discretion."

But why was appellant was "unable to cite directly to the report"? It is a duly published report of a prestigious advisory body. Appellate lawyers and courts frequently cite books, articles, and reports about scientific research and policy. National Academy reports and Office of Technology Assessment reports have long been cited and discussed in opinions on the admissibility of DNA evidence. They address "legislative facts." Legislative facts apply across cases." In contrast, "adjudicative facts" are not general truth; they are the how, what, where, and when of specific cases.

Under the Nebraska Rule of Evidence (see, e.g., Neb. R. Evid. 201(a)), only adjudicative facts need to be proved at trial. Both appellate and trial courts have the power to consult published scientific opinions on the limitations of a scientific method. Here, the alleged limitation is that the software was not shown to work well with mixtures that contain very small fractions of a suspect's DNA. Courts should be more open to receiving information in the scientific and related literature on such issues.

Thursday, August 15, 2019

Post PCAST: Washington D.C. High Court Won't Tolerate No-doubt Testimony Matching a Bullet to a Single Gun

In an opinion relying in part on the PCAST Report on feature-comparison evidence, the District of Columbia's highest court discussed limits on the testimony a firearms-toolmark examiner can give. But it did not get very far. An earlier opinion in Williams v. United States, 130 A.3d 343 (D.C. 2016), determined that the admission of some extreme testimony (described below) was not plain error. In Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734 (D.C. 2019) (Williams II), the Court of Appeals revisited the plain-error question in light of later rulings decided before sentencing. It concluded that even though entertaining the opinion testimony was "error" and the error was "plain," the "plain error" exception to the rule against reversing a conviction on the basis of unobjected-to testimony did not justify reversal. (I know, that is a convoluted sentence, but the law on the plain-error exception to the need for a contemporaneous objection is convoluted.)

At trial,
[T]he examiner opined that “these three bullets were fired from this firearm.” On redirect, when asked whether there was “any doubt in [his] mind” that the bullets recovered from Mr. Kang's SUV were fired from the gun found in Mr. Williams's bedroom, the examiner responded, “[n]o, sir.” The examiner elaborated that “[t]hese three bullets were identified as being fired out of Exhibit No. 58. And it doesn't matter how many firearms Hi[-]Point made. Those markings are unique to that gun and that gun only.” The examiner then restated his unequivocal opinion: “Item Number 58 fired these three bullets.”
(Citations omitted). On the petition for rehearing that generated the Williams II opinion, the government relied on a footnote in one of these cases, Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172 (D.C. 2016). The note in Gardner stated that the holding was “limited in that it allows toolmark experts to offer an opinion that a bullet or shell casing was fired by a particular firearm, but it does not permit them to do so with absolute or 100% certainty.” 140 A.3d at 1184 n.19. The government argued in Williams II that "this footnote authorized opinion testimony identifying a specific bullet as having been fired by a specific gun."

Justice Catharine Easterly's opinion for the court found this interpretation of the footnote "difficult to square with the above-the-line holding that the trial court 'had erred' by admitting the examiner's 'unqualified opinion,' that the 'the silver gun was the murder weapon.'" Id. at 1184. The opinion added that
Moreover, the publication post Gardner of another federal government report—President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”), Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (Sept. 2016), ... reiterates toolmark and firearms examiners do not currently have a basis to give opinion testimony that matches a specific bullet to a specific gun and that such testimony should not be admitted without a verifiable error rate does not support the government's argument that only express statements of certainty should be prohibited.
Nonetheless, the opinion did not "resolve the ambiguity of Gardner's footnote because "in this case ... the firearms and toolmark examiner not only testified ... that a specific bullet could be matched to a specific gun, but also that he did not have 'any doubt' about his conclusion." (Footnote omitted.) In the end, after emphasizing that the no-doubt-specific-source testimony "was error," and "the error is plain," the court only held that the plain-error exception to the rule against reversing on the basis of evidence that was not the subject of a contemporaneous objection did not apply. It did not apply because, considering "the government['s] powerful circumstantial case" in other respoects, "Mr. Williams ... cannot show a reasonable probability of a different result absent this error."

Reading between the lines, it appears that Justice Easterly was unable to convince the other two panel members to explicitly adopt (in dictum) the procedure PCAST recommended for source attributions -- a categorical conclusion accompanied by the upper bound of an estimated rate of Type I error as seen in so-called black-box experiments (or something similar). She wrote separately that the Gardner footnote "can only logically be understood in one way: as an acknowledgment that the government might be able to present expert opinion testimony that a specific bullet was fired by a specific a gun if the examiner could reliably qualify his pattern-matching opinion—i.e., if he can provide a verifiable error rate." To which Senior Judge Frank Nebeker replied in his separate opinion: "This is not a case in which to resolve the knotty question of to what degree of certainty, or not, an expert's opinion is admissible as to a particular fact." 1/

NOTE
  1. Whether any source-attribution opinion -- with or without some initial qualification as to the degree of certainty -- is necessary or desirable is a further question, even more removed from what Judge Nebeker loosely called a "harmless error judgment." (The harmless-error doctrine is a little different from the plain-error doctrine.)

Saturday, July 6, 2019

Distorting Daubert and Parting Ways with PCAST in Romero-Lobato

United States v. Romero-Lobato 1/ is another opinion applying the criteria for admissibility of scientific evidence articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 2/ to uphold the admissibility of a firearms examiner's conclusion that the microscopic marks on recovered bullets prove that they came from a particular gun. To do so, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada rejects the conclusions of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) on validating a scientific procedure.

This is not to say that the result in the case is wrong. There is a principled argument for admitting suitably confined testimony about matching bullet or ammunition marks. But the opinion from U.S. District Court Judge Larry R. Hicks does not contain such an argument. The court does not reach the difficult question of how far a toolmark expert may go in forging a link between ammunition and a particular gun. It did not have to. In what seems to be a poorly developed challenge to firearms-toolmark expertise, the defense sought to exclude all testimony about such an association.

This posting describes the facts of the case, the court's description of the law on the admissibility of source attributions by firearms-toolmark examiners, and its review of the practice under the criteria for admitting scientific evidence set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert.

I. THE FIREARMS EVIDENCE IN THE CASE

A grand jury indicted Eric Romero-Lobato for seven felonies. On March 4, 2018, he allegedly tried to rob the Aguitas Bar and Grill and discharged a firearm (a Taurus PT111 G2) into the ceiling. On May 14, he allegedly stole a woman's car at gunpoint while she was cleaning it at a carwash. Later that night, he crashed the car in a high-speed chase On the front passenger's seat, was a Taurus PT111 G2 handgun.

Steven Johnson, a supervising criminalist in the Forensic Science Division of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office," 3/ was prepared to testify that the handgun had fired a round into the ceiling of the bar. Romero-Lobato moved "to preclude the testimony." The district court held a pretrial hearing at which Johnson testified to his background, training, and experience. He explained that he matched the bullet to the gun using the "AFTE method" advocated by the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners.

Defendant's challenge rested "on the critical NAS and PCAST Reports as evidence that 'firearms analysis' is not scientifically valid and fails to meet the requisite threshold for admission under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702." Apparently, the only expert at the hearing was the Sheriff Department's criminalist. Judge Hicks denied the motion to exclude Johnson's expert opinion testimony and issued a relatively detailed opinion.

II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A DAUBERT ANALYSIS

Skipping over the early judicial resistance to "this is the gun" testimony, 4/ the court noted that despite misgivings about such testimony on the part of several federal district courts, only one reported case has barred all source opinion testimony 5/ and the trend among the more critical courts is to search for ways to admit the conclusion with qualifications on its certainty.

Judge Hicks did not pursue the possibility of admitting but constraining the testimony, apparently because the defendant did ask for that. Instead, the court reasoned that to overcome the inertia of the current caselaw, a defendant must have extraordinarily strong evidence (although it also recognized that the burden is on the government to prove scientific validity under Daubert) .The judge wrote:
[T]he defense has not cited to a single case where a federal court has completely prohibited firearms identification testimony on the basis that it fails the Daubert reliability analysis. The lack of such authority indicates to the Court that defendant's request to exclude Johnson's testimony wholesale is unprecedented, and when such a request is made, a defendant must make a remarkable argument supported by remarkable evidence. Defendant has not done so here.
Defendant's less-than-remarkable evidence was primarily two consensus reports of scientific and other experts who reviewed the literature on firearms-mark comparisons. 6/  Both are remarkable. The first document was the highly publicized National Academy of Sciences committee report on improving forensic science. The committee expressed concerns about the largely subjective comparison process and the absence of studies to adequately measure the uncertainty in the evaluations. The court deemed these to be satisfied by a single research report submitted to Department of Justice, which funded the study:
The NAS Report, released in 2009, concluded that “[s]ufficient studies have not been done to understand the reliability and repeatability” of firearm and toolmark examination methods. ... The Report's main issue with the AFTE method was that it did not provide a specific protocol for determining a match between a shell casing or bullet and a specific firearm. ... Instead, examiners were to rely on their training and experience to determine if there was a “sufficient agreement” (i.e. match) between the mark patterns on the casing or bullet and the firearm's barrel. ... During the Daubert hearing, Johnson testified about his field's response to the NAS Report, pointing to a 2013 study from Miami-Dade County (“Miami-Dade Study”). The Miami-Dade Study was conducted in direct response to the NAS Report and was designed as a blind study to test the potential error rate for matching fired bullets to specific guns. It examined ten consecutively manufactured barrels from the same manufacturer (Glock) and bullets fired from them to determine if firearm examiners (165 in total) could accurately match the bullets to the barrel. 150 blind test examination kits were sent to forensics laboratories across the United States. The Miami-Dade Study found a potential error rate of less than 1.2% and an error rate by the participants of approximately 0.007%. The Study concluded that “a trained firearm and tool mark examiner with two years of training, regardless of experience, will correctly identify same gun evidence.”
A more complete (and accurate) reading of the Miami Dade Police Department's study, shows that it was not designed to measure error rates as they are defined in the NAS report and that the "error rate" was much closer to 1%. That's still small, and, with truly independent verification of an examiners' conclusions, the error rate should be smaller than that for examiners whose findings are not duplicated. Nonetheless, as an earlier posting shows, the data are not as easily interpreted and applied to case work as the report from the crime laboratory suggests.The research study, which has yet to appear in any scientific journal. has severe limitations.

The second report, released late in 2016 by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) flatly maintained that microscopic firearms-marks comparisons had not been scientifically validated. Essentially dismissing the Miami Dade Police and earlier research as not properly designed to measure the ability of examiners to infer whether the same gun fired test bullets and ones recovered from a crime scene, PCAST reasoned that (1) AFTE-type identification had yet to be shown to be "reliable" within the meaning of Rule 702 (as PCAST interpreted the rule); (2) if courts disagreed with PCAST's legal analysis of the rule's requirements, they should at least require examiners associating ammunition with a particular firearm to give an upper bound, as ascertained from controlled experiments, on false-positive associations. (These matters are discussed in previous postings.)

The court did not address the second conclusion and gave little or no weight to the first one. It wrote that the 2016 report
concluded that there was only one study done that “was appropriately designed to test foundational validity and estimate reliability,” the Ames Laboratory Study (“Ames Study”). The Ames Study ... reported a false-positive rate of 1.52%. ... The PCAST Report did not reach a conclusion as to whether the AFTE method was reliable or not because there was only one study available that met its criteria.
All true. PCAST certainly did not write that there is a large body of high quality research that proves toolmark examiners cannot associate expended ammunition with specific guns. PCAST's position is that a single study is not a body of evidence that establishes a scientific theory--replication is crucial. If the court believed that there is such a body of literature, it should have explained the basis for its disagreement with the Council's assessment of the literature. If it agreed with PCAST that the research base is thin, then it should have explained why forensic scientists should be able to testify--as scientists--that they know which gun fired which bullet. This opinion does neither. (I'll come to court's discussion of Daubert below.)

Instead, the court repeats the old news that
the PCAST Report was criticized by a number of entities, including the DOJ, FBI, ATF, and AFTE. Some of their issues with the Report were its lack of transparency and consistency in determining which studies met its strict criteria and which did not and its failure to consult with any experts in the firearm and tool mark examination field.
Again, all true. And all so superficial. That prosecutors and criminal investigators did not like the presidential science advisors' criticism of their evidence is no surprise. But exactly what was unclear about PCAST's criteria for replicated, controlled, experimental proof? In fact, the DOJ later criticized PCAST for being too clear--for having a "nine-part" "litmus test" rather than more obscure "trade-offs" with which to judge what research is acceptable. 7/

And what was the inconsistency in PCAST's assessment of firearms-marks comparisons? Judge Hicks maintained that
The PCAST Report refused to consider any study that did not meet its strict criteria; to be considered, a study must be a “black box” study, meaning that it must be completely blind for the participants. The committee behind the report rejected studies that it did not consider to be blind, such as where the examiners knew that a bullet or spent casing matched one of the barrels included with the test kit. This is in contrast to studies where it is not possible for an examiner to correctly match a bullet to a barrel through process of elimination.
This explanation enucleates no inconsistency. The complaint seems to be that PCAST's criteria for a validating a predominantly subjective feature-comparison procedure are too demanding or restrictive, not that these criteria were applied inconsistently. Indeed, no inconsistency in applying the "litmus test" for an acceptable research design to firearms-mark examinations is apparent.

Moreover, the court's definition of "a 'black box' study" is wrong. All that PCAST meant by "black box" is that the researchers are not trying to unpack the process that examiners use and inspect its components. Instead, they say to the examiner, "Go ahead, do your thing. Just tell us your answer, and we'll see if you are right." The term is used by software engineers who test complex programs to verify that the outputs are what they should be for the inputs. The Turing test for the proposition that "machines can think" is a kind of black box test.

Nonetheless, this correction is academic. The court is right about the fact that PCAST gave no credence to "closed tests" like those in which an examiner sorts bullets into pairs knowing in advance that every bullet has a mate. Such black-box experiments are not worthless. They show a nonzero level of skill, but they are easier than "open tests" in which an examiner is presented with a single pair of bullets to decide whether they have a common source, then another pair, and another, and so on. In Romero-Lobato, the examiner had one bullet from the ceiling to compare to a test bullet he fired from one suspect gun. There is no "trade-off" that would make the closed-test design appropriate for establishing the examiner's skill at the task he performed.

All that remains of the court's initial efforts to avoid the PCAST report is the tired complaint about a "failure to consult with any experts in the firearm and tool mark examination field." But what consultation does the judge think was missing? The scientists and technologists who constitute the Council asked the forensic science community for statements and literature to support their practices. It shared a draft of its report with the Department of Justice before finalizing it. After releasing the report, it asked for more responses and issued an addendum. Forensic-services providers may complain that the Council did not use the correct criteria, that its members were closed-minded or biased, or that the repeated opportunities to affect the outcome were insufficient or even a sham. But a court needs more than a throw-away sentence about "failure to consult" to justify treating the PCAST report as suspect.

 III. DISTORTING DAUBERT

Having cited a single, partly probative police laboratory study as if it were a satisfactory response to the National Academy's concerns and having colored the President's Council report as controversial without addressing the limited substance of the prosecutors' and investigators' complaints, the court offered a "Daubert analysis." It marched through the five indicia that the Supreme Court enumerated as factors that courts might consider in assessing scientific validity and reliability.

A. It Has Been Tested

The Romero-Lobato opinion made much of the fact that "[t]he AFTE methodology has been repeatedly tested" 8/ through "numerous journals [sic] articles and studies exploring the AFTE method" 9/ and via Johnson's perfect record on proficiency tests as proved by his (hearsay and character evidence) testimony. Einstein once expressed impatience "with scientists who take a board of wood, look for its thinnest part and drill a great number of holes where drilling is easy." 10/ Going through the drill of proficiency testing does not prove much if the tests are simple and unrealistic. A score of trivial or poorly designed experiments should not engender great confidence. The relevant question under Daubert is not simply "how many tests so far?" It is how many challenging tests have been passed. The opinion makes no effort to answer that question. It evinces no awareness of the "10 percent error rate in ballistic evidence" noted in the NAS Report, that prompted corrective action in the Detroit Police crime laboratory.

Instead of responding to PCAST's criticisms of the design of the AFTE Journal studies, the court wrote that "[a]lthough both the NAS and PCAST Reports were critical of the AFTE method because of its inherent subjectivity, their criticisms do not affect whether the technique they criticize has been repeatedly tested. The fact that numerous studies have been conducted testing the validity and accuracy of the AFTE method weighs in favor of admitting Johnson's testimony."

But surely the question under Daubert is not whether there have been "numerous studies." It is what these studies have shown about the accuracy of trained examiners to match a single unknown bullet with control bullets from a single gun. The court may have been correct in concluding that the testing prong of Daubert favors admissibility here, but its opinion fails to demonstrate that "[t]here is little doubt that the AFTE method of identifying firearms satisfies this Daubert element."

B. Publication and Peer Review

Daubert recognizes that, to facilitate the dissemination, criticism, and modification of theories, modern science relies on publication in refereed journals that members of the scientific community read. Romero-Lobato deems this factor to favor admission for two reasons. First, the AFTE Journal in which virtually all the studies dismissed by PCAST appear, uses referees. That it is not generally regarded as a significant scientific journal -- it is not available through most academic libraries, for example -- went unnoticed.

Second, the court contended that "of course, the NAS and PCAST Reports themselves constitute peer review despite the unfavorable view the two reports have of the AFTE method. The peer review and publication factor therefore weighs in favor of admissibility." The idea that the rejection in consensus reports of a series of studies as truly validating a theory "weighs in favor of admissibility" is difficult to fathom. Some readers might find it preposterous.

C. Error Rates

Just as the court was content to rely on the absolute number of studies as establishing that the AFTE method has been adequately tested, it takes the error rates reported in the questioned studies at face value. Finding the numbers to be "very low," and implying (without explanation) that PCAST's criteria are too "strict," it concludes that Daubert's "error rate" factor too "weighs in favor of admissibility."

A more plausible conclusion is that a large body of studies that fail to measure the error rates (false positive and negative associations) appropriately but do not indicate very high error rates is no more than weakly favorable to admission. (For further discussion, see the previous postings on the court's discussion of the Miami Dade and Ames Laboratory technical reports.)

D. Controlling Standards

The court cited no controlling standards for the judgment of  "'sufficient agreement' between the 'unique surface contours' of two toolmarks." After reciting the AFTE's definition of "sufficient agreement," Judge Hicks decided that "matching two tool marks essentially comes down to the examiner's subjective judgment based on his training, experience, and knowledge of firearms. This factor weighs against admissibility."

However, the opinion adds that "the consecutive matching striae ('CMS') method," which Johnson used after finding "sufficient agreement," is "an objective standard under Daubert." It is "objective" because an examiner cannot conclude that there is a match unless he "observes two or more sets of three or more consecutive matching markings on a bullet or shell casing." The opinion did not consider the possibility that this numerical rule does little to confine discretion if no standard guides the decision of  whether a marking matches. Instead, the opinion debated whether the CMS method should be considered objective and confused that question with how widely the method is used.

The relevant inquiry is not whether a method is subjective or objective. For a predominantly subjective method, the question is whether standards for making subjective judgments will produce more accurate and more reliable (repeatable and reproducible) decisions and how much more accurate and reliable they will be.

E. General Acceptance

Finally, the court found "widespread acceptance in the scientific community." But the basis for this conclusion was flimsy. It consisted of statements from other courts like "the AFTE method ... is 'widely accepted among examiners as reliable'" and "[t]his Daubert factor is designed to prohibit techniques that have 'only minimal support' within the relevant community." Apparently, the court regarded the relevant community as confined to examiners. Judge Hicks wrote that
it is unclear if the PCAST Report would even constitute criticism from the “relevant community” because the committee behind the report did not include any members of the forensic ballistics community ... . The acceptance factor therefore weighs in favor of admitting Johnson's testimony.
If courts insulate forensic-science service providers from the critical scrutiny of outside scientists, how can they legitimately use the general-acceptance criterion to help ascertain whether examiners are presenting "scientific knowledge" à la Daubert?

NOTES
  1. No. 3:18-cr-00049-LRH-CBC, 2019 WL 2150938 (D. Nev. May 16, 2019).
  2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
  3. For a discussion of a case involving inaccurate testimony from the same laboratory that caught the attention of the Supreme Court, see David H. Kaye, The Interpretation of DNA Evidence: A Case Study in Probabilities, National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, Science Policy Decision-making Educational Modules, 2016, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810744; McDaniel v. Brown: Prosecutorial and Expert Misstatements of Probabilities Do Not Justify Postconviction Relief — At Least Not Here and Not Now, Forensic Sci., Stat. & L., July 7, 2014, http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2014/07/mcdaniel-v-brown-prosecutorial-and.html.
  4. See David H. Kaye, Firearm-Mark Evidence: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 723, 724-25 (2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3117674. The court relied on the article's explication of more modern case law.
  5. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado  excluded toolmark conclusions in the prosecutions for the bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma City. The toolmarks there came from a screwdriver. David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence 686-87 (2d ed. 2011).
  6. The court was aware of an earlier report from a third national panel of experts raising doubts about the AFTE method, but it did not cite or discuss that report's remarks. Although the 2008 National Academies report on the feasibility of establishing a ballistic imaging database only considered the forensic toolmark analysis of firearms in passing, it gave the practice no compliments. Kaye, supra note 2, a 729-32.
  7. Ted Robert Hunt, Scientific Validity and Error Rates: A Short Response to the PCAST Report, 86 Fordham L. Rev. Online Art. 14 (2017), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=flro.
  8. Quoting United States v. Ashburn, 88 F.Supp.3d 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
  9. Citing United States v. Otero, 849 F.Supp.2d 425, 432–33 (D.N.J. 2012), for "numerous journals [sic] articles and studies exploring the AFTE method."
  10. Philipp Frank, Einstein's Philosophy of Science, Reviews of Modern Physics (1949).
FURTHER READING
MODIFIED: 7 July 2019 9:10 EST